With Simon Luechinger:
2003 Defence Peace Economics , abstract: "Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism, both in actual politics and rational choice analyses of terrorism. But there are superior strategies to deterrence. One is to make terrorist attacks less attractive. Another to raise the opportunity cost – rather than the material cost – to terrorists. These alternative strategies effectively dissuade potential terrorists. The strategies suggested here build on the benevolence” system and tend to produce a positive sum game among the interacting parties."
2004 European Journal of Political Economy (did cite previous paper), abstract: "Consideration of anti-terrorism policy has focused almost exclusively on deterrence that seeks to fend off terrorism by raising the costs of undertaking terrorist acts. This paper suggests an alternative approach to anti-terrorism policy that is based on reducing the expected benefits of undertaking terrorist acts to prospective terrorists rather than raising the costs of doing so. Specifically, it is argued that strengthening decentralized decision-making in the polity and economy provides disincentives for terrorist attacks."
Chapter in the book The Economic Analysis of Terrorism 2007, conclusion: "As the preceding discussion suggests, strengthening decentralized decisionmaking may be an effective antidote against terrorist attacks"
Chapter in the book The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism 2007, introduction: "In this chapter we argue that there are superior strategies to deterrence ... terrorists can be effectively dissuaded from attacking either if the utility of committing an attack to the terrorist is lowered or if the opportunity cost is raised. We propose three strategies to deal with terrorists, first two aiming at lowering the utility (...) third attempting to raise opportunity costs"
2008 Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy (did cite previous papers), abstract: "Deterrence has been a crucial element in fighting terrorism. An economic analysis of terrorism also points to alternative and potentially superior policies. We suggest three policies that can well be integrated into existing constitutions of democratic and rule-based countries. Two policies are based on diminishing the benefits of committing terrorist acts for prospective terrorists. This can be done by decentralising various parts of society or by diverting attention from terrorists, once a terrorist act has been committed. A third policy is to raise the relative costs of terrorism by lowering the costs of non-violent means for pursuing political goals."
Frey, Bruno S. & Simon Luechinger (2003), "How to Fight Terrorism: Alternatives to Deterrence." Defence and Peace Economics 14(4), 237-249. DOI:10.1080/1024269032000052923 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1024269032000052923
Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger (2004), "Decentralization as a disincentive for terror." European Journal of Political Economy 20(2), 509–515. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S017626800400031X
Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger (2006), "Decentralization as a response to terror", in: The Economic Analysis of Terrorism (Routledge Studies in Defence and Peace Economics), editor: Tilman Brück, Routledge.
Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger (2007), "Terrorism: Considering New Policies", in: The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism, editors: Harry W Richardson, Peter Gordon and James E. Moore II, Edward Elgar Pub.
Frey, Bruno S., Simon Luechinger (2008), "Three Strategies to deal with Terrorism", Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy 27(2), 107–114. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1759-3441.2008.tb01030.x/pdf